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THE EFFICIENCY WAGE HYPOTHESIS AND THE ROLE OF CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE IN FIRM PERFORMANCE
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As well as a two-fold contribution to the literature as highlighted in their paper“, Financial 
Disruptions and the Cyclical Upgrading of Labor” (2017:8), and elaborated on by Epstein et 
al, the reconciliation of two quantitative limitations of current general equilibrium theories 
constituting part of such contribution, this paper highlights the need to incorporate other 
theories such as those relating to the economics of the firm – in explaining firm 
performance – given the previously highlighted limitations of “canonical models”. 
 
The inability to account for variables which are independent of exogenously or endogenously 
determined factors and which are outside their model, also necessitates the incorporation of 
other theories and factors to be taken into account in arriving  at more accurate conclusions 
which determine firm performance. 
 
Key words; efficiency wage hypothesis, pro cyclicality, financial cycles, firm performance, 
corporate governance  
 
Background and Review of Literature 
 
According to Yellen (1984: 200), The models surveyed (in her paper) are variants of the 
efficiency wage hypothesis, according to which, labor productivity depends on the real wage 
paid by the firm. If wage cuts harm productivity, then cutting wages may end up raising labor 
costs. Hence, she argues, rather decrease wages – in a bid to employ more workers – as well 
as raise firm’s revenue, firms are rather reluctant to do this since it would, overall, result in 
lower productivity.
2
 In applying this to the dual labor markets, she adds that the Efficiency 
Wage Hypothesis applies to the primary sector – whilst under the secondary sector where 
anyone can obtain a job at a lower pay, the market is addressed to an extent as a result of 
employees who are willing to accept lower wages – even though this does not fully address 
involuntary employment.  
 
Other Theories to Be Considered 
Principal Agent Theory 
Fama(1980). “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm” Journal of Political Economy, 
Vol 88, pages 288-307 
 
Theory of the Firm 
Jensen and Meckling (1976). “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs, 
Ownership Structure.” Journal of Financial Economics, Vol 3 305-360 
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 “That any reduction in the wage paid would lower the productivity of all employees already on the job”. 
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Corporate Governance Theory 
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (Bhagat and Bolton) 
 
 
Moral Hazard Considerations 
 
How employers can effectively design contracts – particularly long term contracts – such that 
they: 
 
1) Do not unduly encourage lax attitudes by employees: 
Who regard themselves as being too important (to the company) to be fired – hence overly 
conveying the assurance of job security  
 
2) Whilst also incorporating necessary incentives and considerations into such contracts. 
Loyalty schemes, bonuses, perks have their place of importance – so also motivation and 
morale amongst employees.  Justifications for rewarding and encouraging certain “prized” 
employees than others vital. Newly employed workers should also be appreciated where they 
have demonstrated or possess skills which are as important as those that have been acquired 
by longstanding firm employees. 
 
Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
 
According to Bhagat and Bolton (2007:8), efforts to improve corporate governance should 
focus on stock ownership of board members - since in their opinion, it is positively related to 
both future operating performance – as well as the probability of disciplinary management 
turnover in poorly performing firms. Of further interest, are observations made in relation to 
the negative relationship which exists between board independence and future operating 
performance, which in their view, could place board independence in a position of merit – 
where such is targeted as a means of “disciplining management of poorly performing firms”.  
 
“Greater stock ownership by the board”, they further  add, “would help internalize costs (and 
benefits) associated with greater disclosure as highlighted by Hermalin and Weisbach (2007) 
(cited) at the decision making (board) level.” 
 
Conclusion 
With an increasingly digitalized and intertwined global economy, fueled by increased and 
advanced information technologies, as well as impacting sectors of ecommerce on the 
financial – and indeed conglomeratized sectors, new and evolving forms of risks have 
necessitated the skills and expertise of specialists such as forensic accounting experts – as a 
means of addressing gaps resulting from inabilities of traditional audit techniques to 
effectively address and manage such risks – particularly in a timely manner. Further ,whether 
risks such as risks of corruption - as varies according to different cultures and environments 
can effectively be managed by auditors, also constitutes growing interest. 
 
Herein lies a growing role and the forging of a more formidable identity by forensic 
accountants. See also (Huber and DiGabriele). Understanding different cultures – in efforts 
aimed at addressing fraud and corruption, is not only essential to current jurisdictional and 
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collaborative efforts, but also vital to addressing and managing cross service sector risks – as 
well as newly evolved risks associated with globalization and conglomeration. 
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rOther Theories to Be Considered 
Background and Review of 
 ) 
 LINK BETWEEN FINANCIAL SHOCKS AND THE BORROWING CAPACITY 
OF FIRMS 
 (EPSTEIN ET AL: 2017): 
 1) SHOCK TIGHTENS FIRMS’ COLLATERAL CONSTRAINTS, WITH 
 2) RESULTING AND CONSEQUENTIAL INCREASES IN THEIR COLLATERAL 
SHADOW VALUES 
 3) ADVERSE IMPACTS ON INCENTIVES TO HIRE WORKERS; 
 4)GENERATING GREATER VOLATILITY IN RECRUITING 
 
BACKGROUND AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
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ASCERTAINING THE REAL 
DEFINITION OF FRAUD 
